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The presence of Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) on Twitter has greatly 
diminished over the past five years as Daesh’s propaganda dissemination strategy has evolved. Yet 
some Daesh supporters have persevered in their use of Twitter, using throwaway accounts to share 
outlinks to pro-Daesh materials on other platforms. This article analyses 892 outlinks found in 11,520 
tweets that contained the word Rumiyah (Daesh’s online magazine). It evaluates Twitter’s response 
to attempts to use its platform to signpost users to Rumiyah in the context of the wider social media 
ecosystem and highlights the role played by botnet activity in efforts to disseminate the magazine 
and the impact of traditional news media coverage. 
 
Five years have now passed since Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) 
enjoyed its ‘Golden Age’ on Twitter.1 The ISIS Twitter Census conducted by Berger and Morgan in 
2015 found that during October and November 2014 there were no fewer than 46,000 overt Daesh 
supporter accounts on Twitter – and possibly as many as 90,000. The average number of followers of 
these accounts was 1004, and each account posted an average of 7.3 tweets per day over its 
lifetime.2 As well as proselytisation, recruitment and firming up the resolve of followers, Daesh 
utised the new capabilities offered by social media to employ the platform for psychological warfare 
purposes.3 
 
Since then Daesh’s presence on Twitter has been reduced significantly. Towards the end of 2014 
Twitter began an aggressive campaign of suspensions. Berger and Morgan found that, by February 
2015, Daesh supporters on Twitter were having to devote far more time to rebuilding their 
networks.4 A follow-up study conducted by Berger and Perez also found that suspension activity had 
a significant disruptive effect.5 Individual users who repeatedly created new accounts after being 
suspended ‘suffered devastating reductions in their follower counts’ and declines in networks 
persisted even when suspension pressure eased, ‘suggesting that suspensions diminish activity in 
ways that extend beyond the simple removal of accounts’.6  
 
In response, IS supporters resorted to the use of a variety of countermeasures. These included 
locking their accounts so that they were no longer publicly accessible, using an innocuous image or 
the default egg as the avatar image and selecting a random combination of letters and numbers as 
the user handle or screen name.7 However, ‘A conscious, supportive and influential virtual 
community is almost impossible to maintain in the face of the loss of access to such group or 
                                                        
1 Maura Conway et al., Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and its Impacts 
(VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), p. 28. 
2 J M Berger and Jonathon Morgan. ‘The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS 
Supporters on Twitter’, Analysis Paper No. 20, March 2015, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. 
3 Jytte Klausen, ‘Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq’, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Vol. 38, No. 1, 2015), pp. 1–22. 
4 Berger and Morgan, ‘The ISIS Twitter Census’, p. 38. 
5 J M Berger and Heather Perez, ‘The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How Suspensions are 
Limiting the Social Networks of English-speaking ISIS Supporters’, George Washington University Program on 
Extremism, Washington, DC, February 2016. 
6 Ibid., p. 4. 
7 Other countermeasures include reverse shoutouts, guides on how to hack and assume control of other user 
accounts and account banks. See, Berger and Perez, ‘The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter’. 
ideological symbols and the resultant breakdown in commitment’.8 Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
Daesh’s community-building activities largely moved to other platforms, in particular Telegram.9 
Importantly, in their study of English-speaking Daesh supporters on Telegram, Clifford and Powell 
found that, whilst Telegram’s suite of features is used by Daesh supporters to interact and 
communicate, to distribute joinlinks to other groups and channels and to provide instructional 
materials, by far the most common function is the distribution of core IS media and, in particular, 
other pro-IS materials (regardless of their origin).10 As well as ‘using Telegram’s file-sharing features 
to disseminate content internally, IS sympathizers on Telegram use external file-sharing sites to 
ensure IS content remains on the internet and resilient to takedowns’.11 A single piece of pro-Daesh 
material may be distributed using dozens of unique URLs on different file-sharing sites so that, even 
if content is removed from one site, stable access exists to others. File-sharing platforms are thus 
utised as ‘black boxes’ to ‘enable the rapid redistribution of content even under conditions of drastic 
policing and filtering’.12 The result is a ‘fragmentation’ of Daesh propaganda that makes these 
materials ‘less trackable by authorities’ and results in a ‘relatively closed and stable digital 
propaganda ecosystem’.13 
 
Whilst Daesh’s dissemination strategy has evolved, some Daesh supporters have persisted in their 
use of Twitter. This continued use largely focuses on the sharing of URLs made available on 
Telegram.14 As Conway et al conclude in their report Disrupting Daesh, Daesh’s Twitter activity ‘has 
largely been reduced to tactical use of throwaway accounts for distributing links to pro-IS content on 
other platforms, rather than as a space for public IS support and influencing activity’.15 Macdonald et 
al.’s examination of Daesh’s attempts to use Twitter to disseminate its online magazines Dabiq and 
Rumiyah found that the throwaway disseminator accounts established by Daesh sympathisers were 
mostly recently established (often less than one day old at the time of suspension), had very few 
followers (sometimes none at all) and received few retweets.16 Some sought to compensate for this 
lack of visibility by repeat posting.  
 
Given that this past research shows that Daesh throwaway disseminator accounts gain little traction 
on Twitter, it is interesting that Daesh and its supporters still persevere with this approach. To better 
                                                        
8 Maura Conway et al., Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and its Impacts 
(VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), p. 30. 
9 Nico Prucha, ‘IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious Identity via 
Telegram’, Perspectives on Terrorism (Vol. 10, No. 6, 2016), pp. 48–58. 
10 Bennett Clifford and Helen Powell, ‘Encrypted Extremism: Inside the English-Speaking Islamic State 
Ecosystem on Telegram’, George Washington University Program on Extremism, Washington, DC, June 2019. 
11 Ibid., p. 24. 
12 Teodor E Mitew and Ahman Shehabat, ‘Black-boxing the Black Flag: Anonymous Sharing Platforms and ISIS 
Content Distribution Tactics’, Perspectives on Terrorism (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2018), pp. 81–99, 97. 
13 Laurence Bindner and Raphael Gluck, ‘Trends in Islamic State’s Online Propaganda: Shorter Longevity, Wider 
Dissemination of Content’, ICCT Perspective, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, 
December 2018.  See also Samantha Weirman and Audrey Alexander, ‘Hyperlinked Sympathizers: URLs and 
the Islamic State’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (April 2018), DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1457204.  
14 Clifford and Powell, ‘Encrypted Extremism’. 
15 Conway et al., ‘Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and its Impacts’, p. 30. 
16 Daniel Grinnell et al., ‘Who Disseminates Rumiyah? Examining the Relative Influence of Sympathiser and 
Non-Sympathiser Twitter Users’, paper presented at the 2nd European Counter Terrorism Centre Advisory 
Group conference, Europol Headquarters, The Hague, 17–18 April 2018, 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/who-disseminates-rumiyah-examining-relative-
influence-of-sympathiser-and-non-sympathiser-twitter-users>, accessed 12 July 2019; Daniel Grinnell, Stuart 
Macdonald and David Mair, ‘The Response of, and on, Twitter to the Release of Dabiq Issue 15’, paper 
presented at the 1st European Counter Terrorism Centre conference on online terrorist propaganda, Europol 
Headquarters, The Hague, 10–11 April 2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-
documents/response-of-and-twitter-to-release-of-dabiq-issue-15>, accessed 12 July 2019. 
understand this phenomenon, how Daesh uses the platform and its place within the wider social 
media ecosystem, this article examines a different aspect of Daesh’s propaganda dissemination 
strategy. Specifically, it conducts an analysis of the outlinks contained in Rumiyah-mentioning 
tweets. After briefly outlining the methodology, the article first examines the hostnames found in 
the outlinks. In keeping with other studies, it highlights the prevalence of smaller platforms and file-
sharing sites. Second, it examines the types of content to which the outlinks led. As well as PDFs of 
Rumiyah, the article shows that a significant proportion of outlinks led to reports and information 
about Rumiyah and explains that the effect of some traditional news media coverage is to amplify 
the message contained in Rumiyah.  Third, the analysis focuses on outlinks to PDFs of Rumiyah and 
shows that Twitter was largely successful in frustrating efforts to use its platform to disseminate the 






Data was collected between 1 November 2016 and 31 October 2017 using the ‘Sentinel’ research 
tool.17 All collected Twitter posts: mentioned the term ‘Rumiyah’; were posted within 21 days of the 
release of a new issue; and were posted from an account that used the English language interface 
(US or UK). The last of these reflected the authors’ decision to focus specifically on users that posted 
about the English language version of Rumiyah (which is also published in multiple other languages). 
The authors also collected the publicly available user data of these posters, the details of each post 
(including when it was posted and whether it was a retweet), the onward distribution counts of 
these posts, and the account status (at the end of the data collection period).18 From these data, the 
authors extracted all posts that: contained original content (that is to say, were not retweets); 
andcontained an outlink.  
 
As Table 1 shows, 11 issues of Rumiyah were published during the data collection period (issues 3 to 
13). As a result of collection drop outs, the data collection for issues 6 and 8 was incomplete.19 These 
issues were therefore excluded from the study. The dataset thus encompasses a total of nine issues. 
 
Table 1: Issues for which data was collected 
 
Table 1: Issues for which data were collected 
Issue Date and time of first tweet collected 
Date and time of last 
tweet collected Notes 
3 11/11/2016 17:18 02/12/2016 17:18  
4 07/12/2016 19:33 28/12/2016 19:33  
5 06/01/2017 16:57 27/01/2017 16:57  
6 04/02/2017 18:53 25/02/2017 18:53 Incomplete collection so not included in the dataset 
                                                        
17 Alun Preece et al., ‘Sentinel: A Codesigned Platform for Semantic Enrichment of Social Media Streams’, IEEE 
Transactions on Computational Social Systems (Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2018), pp. 118–31. The Sentinel platform 
supports semantic enrichment of streamed social media data for the purposes of situational understanding. It 
is founded upon a knowledge-based approach, in which input streams (channels) are characterized by spatial 
and terminological parameters, collected media is pre-processed to identify significant terms (signals), and 
data are tagged (framed) in relation to an ontology. 
18 For the purposes of this study, Sentinel functioned only as a repository of structured data supplied by the 
Twitter Streaming API. 
19 These were short-term drop outs in research data capture infrastructure that resulted in missing 
information in the collection. 
7 07/03/2017 16:04 28/03/2017 16:04  
8 05/04/2017 15:23 26/04/2017 15:23 Incomplete collection so not included in the dataset 
9 04/05/2017 14:40 25/05/2017 14:40  
10 08/06/2017 21:32 29/06/2017 21:32 
Timing moderately uncertain due to 
similarly timed presence of a ‘fake 
issue’ 
11 13/07/2017 15:00 03/08/2017 15:00 Timing highly uncertain due to hashtag flooding and a ‘fake issue’ 
12 06/08/2017 14:47 27/08/2017 14:47  
13 09/09/2017 18:58 30/09/2017 18:58  
 
Source: Author’s research. 
 
An Overview of the Dataset 
 
There was a total of 11,520 posts that contained both original content and an outlink. These 11,520 
posts contained a total of 892 distinct links and were posted by a total of 1,493 distinct user 
accounts.  
 
The data inclusion criteria did not include any requirement that the user posting the outlink was a 
Daesh sympathiser. It is important to note, therefore, that a previous analysis examined the profiles 
of the user accounts in the dataset.20 This found that roughly two-thirds (67.1%) had been 
suspended by the end of the data collection period. The users that were not suspended included 
personal accounts, news organisations, intelligence analysts/practitioners and researchers. The tone 
of these users’ posts was generally either factual or critical.21 By contrast, almost all of the 
suspended accounts (95.8%) were overtly sympathetic to Daesh, and there were hardly any users 
that were overtly sympathetic Daesh that were not suspended (0.3%).22 In the analysis that follows 




The authors analysed data in three stages. In the first stage, they examined the hostnames found in 
the 892 distinct outlinks. The 20 most common hostnames were identified using three different 
measures: the number of posts containing the hostname; the number of distinct links containing the 
hostname; and by the number of distinct users outlinking to it. They then followed each of the 892 
outlinks to see what type of content it linked to. When the link no longer worked, they instead 
looked at the wording of the URL and of the post in which it was contained. Completing this task 
enabled the authors to identify which of the outlinks took users to a PDF of Rumiyah (or had been 
intended to do so). The third stage of the analysis focused on these links by examining their 
hostnames, how many times they had been shared and the account status of those that shared 
them. 
                                                        
20 It should also be noted that, since the previous study focused on users who posted outlinks, the dataset was 
limited to just the first Rumiyah-mentioning tweet posted by each user following the release of each issue. By 
contrast, since the current study focuses on posts containing outlinks, the dataset was not limited in this way 
and so contains all tweets that met the inclusion criteria detailed in the text. 
21 Grinnell et al, ‘Who Disseminates Rumiyah?’ (see Table 6). 
22 Of the 1,517 user accounts examined in the authors’ previous study, 1,018 had been suspended by the end 
of the data collection period. Of these 1,018, 975 were overtly sympathetic to Daesh. See Table 7 and footnote 
3 in Grinnell et al., ‘Who disseminates Rumiyah?’. 
 
Outlinking to Where? 
 
The outlinks in the 11,520 posts in the dataset contained a total of 244 different hostnames. Table 2 
shows the 20 most common hostnames, respectively ordered by the number of posts and the 
number of distinct links containing the hostname. 
 
Table 2: Top 20 Hostnames, by Number of Posts and Distinct Links 
 
Table 2: Top 20 hostnames, by number of posts and distinct links 
By number of posts  By number of distinct links 
Hostname Site type Total  Hostname Site type Total 
ref.gl URL shortener 3733 ref.gl URL shortener 84 
drive.google.com File sharing site 1634 memri.org 




cloud.mail.ru File sharing site 878 archive.org File sharing site 58 
justpaste.it File sharing site 535 drive.google.com File sharing site 54 
cldup.com File sharing site 475 justpaste.it File sharing site 39 
archive.org File sharing site 464 facebook.com Social network 29 
yadi.sk File sharing site 417 4shared.com File sharing site 19 
1drv.ms File sharing site 336 cldup.com File sharing site 17 
jpst.it File sharing site 329 siteintelgroup.com 






dropbox.com File sharing site 188 cloud.mail.ru File sharing site 14 
pc.cd Apparently a URL shortener 160 mediafire.com File sharing site 14 
uploaded.net File sharing site 125 1drv.ms File sharing site 13 
memri.org 









uptobox.com File sharing site 107 dropbox.com File sharing site 12 
4shared.com File sharing site 104 yadi.sk File sharing site 11 
Weather.com Weather site 104 almlf.com File sharing site 11 
turbobit.net File sharing site 90 clarionproject.org 




cloudup.com File sharing site 87 cloudup.com File sharing site 9 
load.to File sharing site 80 dailymail.co.uk Website of a UK-based newspaper 8 






Source: Authors’ research. 
 
The prevalence of file sharing sites and smaller platforms in Table 2 is consistent with previous 
studies.23 Twelve hostnames appear on both lists, ten of which are file sharing sites 
(drive.google.com, cloud.mail.ru, justpaste.it, cldup.com, archive.org, yadi.sk, 1drv.ms, 
dropbox.com, memri.org, 4shared.com, cloudup.com).24 Five of these hostnames appear in the top 
ten of each list. In addition, of the sixteen other hostnames that only appear in one of the lists, eight 
are file sharing sites (jpst.it, uploaded.net, uptobox.com, turbobit.net, load.to, filefactory.com, 
mediafire.com, almlf.com). YouTube appears on neither list. Facebook appears on the ‘distinct links’ 
list only.25 
 
The importance of file-sharing sites is clearer still in Table 3, which lists the top 20 hostnames in 
order of the number of distinct users outlinking to them, as well as the suspension status of these 
users at the end of the data collection period. 
 
Table 3: Top 20 Hostnames, by Number of Distinct Users Outlinking to it 
 
 




drive.google.com File sharing site 3 561 564 
cloud.mail.ru File sharing site 1 351 352 
cldup.com File sharing site 3 291 294 
archive.org File sharing site 6 215 221 
1drv.ms File sharing site 0 180 180 
dropbox.com File sharing site 0 133 133 
yadi.sk File sharing site 1 124 125 
pc.cd Apparently a URL shortener 0 102 102 
4shared.com File sharing site 0 70 70 
cloudup.com File sharing site 1 60 61 
justpaste.it File sharing site 4 40 44 
mediafire.com File sharing site 0 36 36 
counterjihadreport.com Privately run website (password protected) 30 0 30 
icct.nl Website of a Netherlands-based think tank 29 1 30 
memri.org Website of a US-based not-for-profit organisation 29 0 29 
up.top4top.net File sharing site 1 26 27 
clarionproject.org Website of a US-based not-for-profit organisation 20 0 20 
                                                        
23 See Conway et al., ‘Disrupting Daesh’; see also and Clifford and Powell, ‘Encrypted Extremism’. 
24 The other two are ref.gl (which is discussed further in the article) and memri.org. 
25 The data in this table differs from the table of outlinks contained in the authors’ previous study, ‘Who 
Disseminates Rumiyah?’. This is because the previous study focused on users who posted outlinks (so the 
dataset consisted of the first Rumiyah-mentioning tweet posted by 1,392 distinct users), whereas this article 
focuses on posts containing outlinks (so the dataset consists of all 11,520 tweets that contained an outlink). 
terrortrendsbulletin.co
m Personal blog 19 0 19 
heavy.com News and information website 15 4 19 
express.co.uk Website of a UK-based newspaper 17 1 1826 
 
Eleven of the top twelve hostnames in this Table were file sharing sites. The suspension rate for the 
users that posted the links to these hostnames was 99.1%.27 As noted above, the vast majority of the 
user accounts in the dataset that were suspended were overtly sympathetic to Daesh. Table 3 thus 
indicates which file-sharing sites are most commonly used by Daesh sympathisers seeking to 
signpost other users to copies of Rumiyah. Again, the findings are consistent with previous studies.28 
 
Also noteworthy is the fact that ref.gl – which was top of both lists in Table 2 – does not feature in 
Table 3 at all. Known as the ‘Reffy Botnet’, ref.gl is a URL shortener that is commonly used in 
networks of ill-intent. In April 2018, all accounts using the ref.gl shortener were suspended by 
Twitter.29 In the dataset, ref.gl was used in a total of 84 distinct links. These links appeared in a total 
of 3,733 posts (32.4% of the posts in the dataset). Just nine user accounts were responsible for these 
posts (and one of these accounts only posted a single tweet).30 Table 4 shows the date of the first 
and last post captured that contained the ref.gl hostname in the three-week data collection period 
following the release of each relevant issue. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Tweets Posting an Outlink Containing the ref.gl Hostname 
 
 
Issue 10 11 12 13 




19 June 2017, 
19:35 
13 July 2017, 
15:08 









29 June 2017, 
20:45 
3 August 2017, 
14:15 




Total number of 
tweets 679 1086 877 1091 
 
For issues 11, 12 and 13 the first post containing a ref.gl outlink appeared soon after the release of 
the new issue on Twitter – in the case of issue 11, just eight minutes after (see Table 1). This, 
coupled with the sheer volume of tweets (over 50 a day on average) and small number of user 
accounts posting them, are indicative of botnet activity. 
 
Interestingly, the eight user accounts that were responsible for all but one of the posts using the 
ref.gl shortener were also responsible for the 104 posts outlinking to Weather.com (see Table 2), as 
                                                        
26 Facebook also had a total of 18 distinct users (18 extant, 0 suspended) and so was joint 20th.  
27 Based on a total for the eleven hostnames of 19 extant users and 2,061 suspended users. 
28 See Conway et al., ‘Disrupting Daesh’, see also Clifford and Powell, ‘Encrypted Extremism’. 
29 Mike Farb, ‘The Reffy Botnet’, Medium, 29 April 2018, <https://medium.com/@ unhackthevote/the-reffy-
botnet-f8a7dc817e9a>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
30 The nine accounts were @MiddleBeast, @ExtremePropa, @ExtremistWatch_, @islamoinform, @JihadiInfo, 
@TabsTerror, @terror_history1, @terrorwatch1 and @VicPower87. The last of these was responsible for just 
one of the 3,733 tweets. All nine accounts have since been suspended. 
well as a further 69 posts outlinking to AccuWeather.com and 59 posts outlinking to Climate-
Data.org. This apparently indiscriminate use of the word ‘Rumiyah’ is also suggestive of botnet 
activity. 
 
The hostname pc.cd also appeared to be connected to botnet activity. This hostname appeared in a 
total of 160 posts. These were all posted in the space of just over 25 hours,31 by a total of 102 
distinct user accounts (whose user names were randomised collections of letters). All of these user 
accounts were subsequently suspended. 
 
Outlinking to What? 
 
Table 5 breaks down the 892 distinct outlinks, by the type of content each link led to. For those 
outlinks that no longer worked (for example, because the destination page had been removed or the 
hostname had been suspended), the type of content was determined by examining the text of both 
the URL and the post. Given the inherent limitations of relying on the wording of the URL and post, 
the authors drew a distinction between categorisations in which they had a high degree of 
confidence and those in which they had only a moderate degree of confidence. As Table 5 shows, 
even after completing this process, there remained a total of 29 outlinks that were so unclear that 
they could not be categorised. 
 
Table 5: Types of Content Behind the Outlinks 
 
 
Type of content 
Number of distinct 
links (high 
confidence) 





Rumiyah 232 90 322 (36.1%) 
PDF of Rumiyah (but no longer available) 79 228 307 (34.4%) 
PDF of Rumiyah behind subscription or 
password protection 56 3 59 (6.6%) 
Other content (not terrorism-related) 39 11 50 (5.6%) 
Other content (terrorism-related) 27 4 31 (3.5%) 
Academic analysis/writing 14 16 30 (3.3%) 
Not possible to tell - - 29 (3.3%) 
Picture of real Rumiyah issue 16 5 21 (2.4%) 
Picture of fake Rumiyah issue 13 5 18 (2.0%) 
PDF of Rumiyah (currently available) 15 0 15 (1.7%) 
Suspicious “Download” button 5 0 5 (0.6%) 
Fake issue of Rumiyah 5 0 5 (0.6%) 
Total 501 362 892 
 
A total of 381 of the outlinks led to a PDF of Rumiyah. Of these, 307 were no longer available, 59 
were behind a subscription requirement or password protection and just 15 led directly to the PDF. 
These links are discussed further below.  
 
                                                        
31 From 20:06 on 9 September 2017 to 21:26 on 10 September 2017. 
The next most common type of content was report/summary/information about Rumiyah. This 
category consisted largely of news items either specifically about a new issue of the magazine or in 
which Rumiyah featured prominently. In the entire dataset, there were just three posts that were 
retweeted more than 50 times during the data collection period.32 All three outlinked to the same 
news item in the UK’s Daily Mail newspaper, titled ‘ISIS calls on Islamists to carry out knife attacks in 
areas such as alleys, forests and quiet neighbourhoods and told to aim for “a reasonable kill count” 
in latest magazine’.33  
 
The Daily Mail was one of two UK newspapers that, in the aftermath of the recent Christchurch 
attack, posted the video of the attack on its website. This has raised concerns about the traditional 
news media, especially as it has been reported that the attack video only went viral after this 
happened.34 The dataset raises similar questions. For example, one outlink led to an item published 
by the UK’s Metro newspaper in September 2016. It describes how issue 1 of Rumiyah states that 
killing disbelievers is a form of worship to Allah, ‘even the blood of the kafir street vendor selling 
flowers to those passing by’.35 Below this is a photo of a market trader at a flower stall, which the 
magazine’s producers had apparently taken from the trader’s website. The magazine offers no 
indication of the trader’s name or the location of his flower stall. By contrast, the item in Metro 
names the trader and states the area in which his stall is located. A simple Google search reveals 
that several other UK newspapers ran a similar story, including a local newspaper that named the 
street in which the flower stall can be found. The effect of this news coverage was thus to amplify – 
and, importantly, to sharpen – the message contained in Rumiyah.  
 
There were 17 links in the dataset that led to a picture of Rumiyah. These included pictures of the 
front cover, the table of contents and excerpts from the foreword or a specific article.  
 
For all nine issues of Rumiyah in the dataset, the release of the official issue was preceded by fake 
versions.36 The fake version of issue 5, for example, included articles on similar themes to earlier 
issues, whilst fake issue 7 contained the exact titles of articles that appeared in the official copy of 
the same issue, revealing that an insider was involved in the disinformation campaign.37 The 
                                                        
32 There were only 22 posts that were retweeted ten times or more. Four of these outlinked to password-
protected copies of Rumiyah. One outlinked to a PDF of Rumiyah that is no longer available. The others 
outlinked to news items (eight posts), academic analyses (six posts) and other terrorism-related content (three 
posts). 
33 Hannah Al-Othman, ‘ISIS Calls on Islamists to Carry Out Knife Attacks in Areas such as Alleys, Forests and 
Quiet Neighbourhoods and Told to Aim for “a Reasonable Kill Count” in Latest Magazine’, Daily Mail, 5 October 
2016. The three tweets received 220, 54 and 52 retweets respectively. 
34 Tech Against Terrorism, ‘Analysis: New Zealand Attack and the Terrorist Use of the Internet’, undated, 
<https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/2019/03/26/ analysis-new-zealand-attack-and-the-terrorist-use-of-
the-internet/>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
35 Ashitha Nagesh, ‘Isis Magazine Urges Followers to Kill a Random Florist in Cheshire’, Metro, 7 September 
2016. 
36 The tweets in the dataset outlinked to fake versions of six issues (4, 5, 9, 11, 12 and 13). It is important to 
add, however, that, for each issue in the study, the data collection commenced once the official publication 
had been released. Since the fake issues tended to be released before the official one, it is possible that there 
were tweets outlinking to fake issues that were not part of the dataset. For example, as the main text explains, 
there was a fake version of issue 7, but none of the tweets in the dataset outlinked to it. As Table 1 above 
shows, there was also a fake version of issue 10, but again none of the tweets in the dataset outlinked to it. 
And it has been reported that there was a fake version of issue 3 (Antonis Samouris, ‘Jihadist Strategies on the 
Internet: How the Decline in IS Official Propaganda Raises the Visibility of Pro-IS User-Generated Content’, in 
Andreas Gofas (ed.), Terrorism and European Security Governance (Florence: European University Institute, 
2018)). In short, there were fake versions of all nine issues in the study. 
37 Samouris, ‘Jihadist Strategies on the Internet’. 
objective of these fake issues was apparently to confuse supporters and/or to collect information on 
them through embedded malware.38 In response, Daesh sympathisers were encouraged to validate 
the authenticity of any new content by checking for its simultaneous appearance on the Telegram 
channels of core disseminators. This system of validation meant that the fake issues were not picked 
up by the community of Daesh sympathisers.39 Indeed, in the dataset there were only five links that 
led to a PDF of a fake issue of the magazine.40 Five other links led to a suspicious download button 
that promised a copy of the magazine – the authors did not click on these, for security reasons. 
There were also 16 links to pictures of fake issues of Rumiyah. These were largely pictures of a front 
cover. Some of the fake front cover pictures were accompanied by a download button, which again 
the authors did not click for security reasons. 
 
The remaining three categories were: academic analysis/writing (30 links); other content (terrorism-
related) (31 links); and, other content (not terrorism-related) (50 links). The second of these 
categories covered content that, whilst unrelated to Rumiyah, did focus more generally on the 
activities of Daesh or another terrorist actor or group. The other content (not terrorism-related) was 
an eclectic mix. As well as the links to weather forecasts mentioned above, it also included such 
things as advertisements for a social media analytics company and a baby name website (offering 
the meaning of the name ‘Rumiyah’).  
 
Finally, it should be noted that there were instances of an outlink leading to a news item or blog 
(and so was counted in the report/summary/information category), where the item/blog in turn 
contained a link to an issue of Rumiyah. There were four instances of this. Of these, two of the sub-
links led to a freely available copy of Rumiyah, one led to a copy that was behind password 
protection and the final one no longer worked. 
 
Outlinking to Full Copy PDFs of Rumiyah 
 
The results presented so far have shown the variety of content that the Rumiyah-mentioning tweets 
in the dataset outlinked to, and indicated which file-sharing sites are most commonly used by Daesh 
sympathisers seeking to signpost other users to copies of Rumiyah.  
 
The 381 outlinks to a PDF of Rumiyah contained a total of 48 different hostnames. These are listed in 
Table 6. Table 6 also shows the number of distinct outlinks containing each hostname, as well as the 
total number of posts containing these outlinks and the number of reposts these posts received. 
(Hostnames for which there were just one or two distinct links appear in a single category, ‘Other 
hostnames’). 
 





















drive.google.com 53 1631 85 1716 
                                                        
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 These were identified as being fake by comparing them to the issues of Rumiyah stored in repositories 
maintained by subject experts. 
archive.org 53 442 171 613 
ref.gl 32 1450 81 1531 
justpaste.it 29 82 138 220 
cldup.com 26 562 70 632 
4shared.com 18 103 15 118 
cloud.mail.ru 13 877 37 914 
siteintelgroup.com 13 27 70 97 
mediafire.com 13 44 11 55 
1drv.ms 12 335 10 345 
dropbox.com 12 188 13 201 
pietervanostaeyen.com 12 17 25 42 
memri.org 12 15 2 17 
yadi.sk 11 417 4 421 
almlf.com 10 15 7 22 
counterjihadreport.com 8 46 31 77 
up.top4top.net 5 27 10 37 
trackingterrorism.org 5 5 6 11 
facebook.com 3 3 0 3 
Other hostnames 41 522 14 536 
Grand Total 381 6808 800 7608 
 
Source: Authors’ research 
 
Two points in particular emerge from Table 6. The first is that 5,714 (83.9%) of the posts outlinked to 
just seven of the hostnames: drive.google.com; archive.org; ref.gl; cldup.com; cloud.mail.ru; 
1drv.ms; and, yadi.sk. If ref.gl – which was discussed above – is excluded, a total of 4,264 (62.6%) of 
the posts outlinked to the other six hostnames. Table 3 above showed that a total of 1,736 distinct 
users posted links to these six hostnames. Of these, 1,722 (99.2%) had been suspended by the end 
of the data collection period. There was thus a concerted effort by Daesh sympathisers to use these 
six file-sharing sites as black boxes for the distribution of Rumiyah.41 
 
The second point is the ratio of posts to reposts. Between them, the 6,808 posts containing an 
outlink to Rumiyah received a total of just 800 reposts during the data collection period (that is to 
say, 8.51 tweets per retweet). For the six file-sharing sites listed in the previous paragraph, the ratio 
is even higher (11.31 tweets per retweet). Together, the high suspension rate and low number of 
reposts for users outlinking to these six sites indicate that Twitter was successful in frustrating 
efforts to use its platform to disseminate new issues of Rumiyah. 
 
Table 7 focuses exclusively on the fifteen outlinks to openly available PDFs of Rumiyah.42 
 
Table 7: Outlinks to Currently Available PDFs of Rumiyah 
 
 
                                                        
41 Mitew and Shehabat, ‘Black-boxing the Black Flag’.  
















Status of user 
accounts 
cloud.mail.ru 154 0 154 All suspended 
qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1zxuhho-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com 14 3 6 
Five extant, one 
suspended 
adobe.ly 4 0 2 Both extant 
drive.google.com 2 1 2 One extent, one suspended 
azelin.files.wordpress.com 2 1 1 Extant 
azelin.files.wordpress.com 2 0 1 Extant 
jihadology.net 1 0 1 Extant 
cloud.mail.ru 1 0 1 Suspended 
cloudup.com 1 0 1 Suspended 
pietervanostaeyen.com 1 0 1 Extant 
clarionproject.org 1 2 1 Extant 
magentacloud.de 1 0 1 Suspended 
magentacloud.de 1 0 1 Suspended 
reddit.com 1 0 1 Suspended 
reddit.com 1 0 1 Suspended 
Total 187 7 175  
 
Source: Author’s research. 
 
Whilst the fifteen outlinks appeared in a total of 187 posts, 154 of these posts contained the same 
URL. These 154 tweets were all posted by different users. The names of all these users were 
randomised collections of numbers and letters, and all accounts had been suspended by the end of 
the data collection period – though curiously the outlink remained functional. The other fourteen 
outlinks appeared in a combined total of 33 posts. These tweets were posted by a total of 19 distinct 
users.44 They received just seven retweets.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that twelve of the user accounts remain extant is not indicative of a failure on 
Twitter’s part to enforce its terms of service (the Twitter Rules). The rules prohibit promoting and 
recruiting for a violent extremist group. In accordance with this, and as the authors’ previous studies 
found, the accounts of non-Daesh sympathisers who post outlinks to the group’s magazine (for 
example, for research purposes or general interest) are not suspended.45 
 
Following from this, it is noteworthy that four of the URLs in Table 7 outlink to repositories 
maintained by researchers (and a fifth outlinked to a repository maintained by a NGO, the Clarion 
                                                        
43 For ethical reasons, the articlelists only the hostname and not the complete URL. For this reason, some 
hostnames appear more than once. 
44 The figures in the relevant column in Table 7 add up to 21. The reason for this apparent disparity is that 
there were two users that shared more than one of the outlinks. (The same user shared both of the outlinks to 
reddit.com, and another user shared two distinct links to Jihadology).  
45 Daniel Grinnell et al., ‘Who Disseminates Rumiyah?’; Daniel Grinnell, Stuart Macdonald and David Mair, ‘The 
Response of, and on, Twitter to the Release of Dabiq Issue 15’. 
Project). Three of these URLs outlinked to the website Jihadology.46 This site has received much 
scrutiny in recent months – in 2018, reports indicated that the UK government had urged 
WordPress.com to place the site’s contents behind password protection or close it altogether.47 In 
April 2019, it was announced that, with funding from the Global Internet Forum to Counter 
Terrorism (GIFCT; a consortium of technology companies, founded by Facebook, Google, Twitter and 
Microsoft, that collaborate to tackle terrorist exploitation of their services), the Tech Against 
Terrorism initiative had developed a new interface for Jihadology, to ensure that particularly 
sensitive content is only accessible to users with registered academic/research, governmental, 
journalistic or humanitarian email addresses.48 In terms of this specific study, however, it seems 
clear that Daesh sympathisers did not seek to use Twitter to signpost users to copies of Rumiyah on 
Jihadology. Not only were there only five posts containing outlinks to Jihadology in the entire 
dataset of 11,520 tweets – with these five posts receiving a total of just one retweet during our data 
collection period – none of these five tweets was posted by an Daesh sympathiser.49 
 
The other URL outlinked to the site pietervanostaeyen.com. This site is also hosted by 
WordPress.com, but is password protected. Users are required to register for an account. In spite of 
this, the outlink we collected took us directly to a PDF of an issue of Rumiyah without requiring us to 
enter a password.50 Moreover, the owner has in any event publicly stated that he approves every 
request he receives for access to the website, explaining that he lacks the capacity to vet those who 
request access.51 This illustrates the wider point that smaller platforms may not be able to regulate 
their platforms adequately in the absence of additional support. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This article examined a total of 892 distinct outlinks found in tweets mentioning Rumiyah that were 
posted to Twitter between November 2016 and September 2017. It has shown how Daesh 
sympathisers sought to disseminate issues of the magazine by posting links to a number of different 
file-sharing sites, including several smaller platforms. This approach is in keeping with Daesh’s wider 
dissemination strategy, designed to ensure stable access to its propaganda outputs, although 
interestingly there was no evidence of Daesh seeking to signpost Twitter users to copies of Rumiyah 
that are freely available from repositories maintained by researchers or NGOs. The article also 
highlighted the role of botnet activity in efforts to disseminate Rumiyah, in particular the Reffy 
Botnet. 
 
Twitter’s response to Daesh’s attempts to use the platform as a gateway to Rumiyah appeared 
effective. Each of the instances of botnet activity that uncovered resulted in suspension. There was a 
very high suspension rate (99.2%) for users who posted outlinks to a PDF of Rumiyah hosted on one 
of the six file-sharing sites apparently used byDaesh and the posts containing these outlinks received 
relatively few reposts. 
                                                        
46 The two links using the hostname azelin.files.wordpress.com, plus the one using jihadology.net. 
47 David Bond, ‘How Extremist Videos are Hitting UK Relations with US Tech Groups’, Financial Times, 3 
December 2018. 
48 Tech Against Terrorism, ‘Launching an Updated Version of Jihadology to Limit Terrorist Exploitation of the 
Site’, press release, 10 April 2019, <https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/2019/04/10/press-release-10th-
april-2019-launching-an-updated-version-of-jihadology-to-limit-terrorist-exploitation-of-the-site/>, accessed 
12 July 2019. 
49 The three users that posted these five tweets were two academic researchers and an individual tweeting in 
a personal capacity. 
50 The authors tested this for every other issue of Rumiyah stored on the website and found that this problem 
only existed for this individual issue. 
51 Bob Garfield, ‘Archiving Terrorist Propaganda’, WNYC Studios,  22 March 2019, 
<https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/archiving-terroristpropaganda-jihadology>, accessed 18 June 2019. 
 
The article has also shown that other Twitter users, not sympathetic to Daesh, also post links to 
reports about Rumiyah, academic analyses of it and PDFs of the magazine itself. Since the Twitter 
Rules focus on the promotion of, and recruitment for, violent extremist groups, these non-
sympathisers were not suspended from the platform. Yet at the same time it is important to note 
that traditional news media coverage has had the effect of amplifying the message contained in 
Rumiyah – and posts outlinking to such coverage received the most retweets of all the posts in our 
dataset.  
 
In conclusion, we offer the following three recommendations based on our findings. First, larger 
social media companies have automated means that employ behavioural cues to block content 
(such as. abnormal posting volume or using trending hashtags to gain attention).52 This is valuable in 
the present context, given that botnet activity played a significant role in efforts to disseminate 
Rumiyah. By contrast, many smaller companies rely exclusively on humans to use content-based 
cues to identify and remove terrorist content. Where possible, GIFCT members should develop 
shared automated systems that use behavioural cues to block terrorist content. 
 
Second, there is a pressing need to expand membership of the GIFCT. At present the network has 
fourteen members, a small number in comparison to the 244 different hostnames contained in the 
dataset. Many smaller technology companies lack the capacity needed to meet the standards 
imposed by the GIFCT eligibility criteria.53 Some lack the willingness to abide by these criteria. Here 
policymakers have an important role to play, providing the support required by the former and 
offering appropriate incentives to the latter.  
 
Finally, the role of the traditional news media in the dissemination of terrorist propaganda must be 
addressed. Dialogue is needed between the GIFCT and the traditional news media regarding the use 
of social media to share news coverage that has the effect of amplifying the terrorist message. As 
the UK’s Counter Terrorism Policing Lead, Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, stated in an open letter 
following the attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, ‘it’s time to have a sensible conversation about 
how to report terrorism in a way that doesn’t help terrorists’.54 
 
This article is an extended version of the Research Paper A Study of Outlinks Contained in Tweets 
Mentioning Rumiyah, which was published by the Global Research Network on Terrorism and 
Technology 
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52 Isabelle van der Vegt, Paul Gill, Stuart Macdonald and BennettKleinberg, ‘Shedding Light on Terrorist and 
Extremist Content Removal’, Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology No. 3, RUSI, July 2019. 
53 These can be found at https://gifct.org/members/.  
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